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Fiscal problems are prompting  many developing nations to amend and sometimes restructure their national
old-age programs.  As they do so, these countries seek guidance on how to design market and regulatory
structures to enhance their chances of success. This paper investigates the types of risks facing participants
in retirement systems, and examines which financial, regulatory, and labor market institutions appear most
supportive of retirement system  reforms, and most urgently needed, in developing countries.
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I I. INTRODUCTION
Not so long ago, old age was believed to be a demographic phenomenon reserved for the rich
countries of the world.  But population aging is now recognized as a potent demographic trend not only in
developed nations, but also in the developing world.'  As a result of this worldwide aging trend, pension
systems in many countries have begun to face financial stress.  Actual or prospective retirement system
insolvency is prompting many govemments to restructure their national retirement programs, sometimes
working "at the margin" by making changes in retirement ages and contribution rules, and other times by
restructuring the system from the ground up.2 The problems faced by these nations are not uniform, nor
are their old-age program reformn  efforts identical in structure and intent. Nevertheless, their ultimate goals
are  generally the same: to create an  environment in which promised old-age benefits are made more
affordable, efficient, and equitable.
As international pension reform proceeds, policymakers seek guidance on how to reform their
old-age systems, and also how to build an environment supportive of long-range changes in provision for
old age.  This paper has two objectives: (1) to explore how retirement systems can protect participants
against a range of micro- and macroeconomic  risks, and (2) to show how retirement system reforms can be
supported by other institutional and regulatory changes.
Our discussion begins with an  examnination  of the risks  against which participants might  be
protected in a well-functioning retirement system.  Next we explore how old-age systems rely on other
financial, legal, and economic institutions to fulfill their mission - including banks and insurers, regulatory
agencies, the legal system, and the labor market.  Pension reform is seen to be most successful when the
supportive institutions are constructed so as to enhance the retirement system's objectives.  We conclude
with some thoughts on the sequencing of public pension reforms, paying due attention to the role of these
supportive  institutions.
TI.  MANAGING OLD-AGE RISK
Retirement systems are intended to handle four key risks confronting people in old age, namely
individual  risk;  retirement system  risk;  country-wide risk;  and  nondiversifiable (global)  risk.
Designing a retirement system that can effectively cushion an aging population against these risks requires
(1) understanding the source of the risk; (2) determining how to avoid and reduce the risks where possible
(with due regard to the costs and benefits of doing so); and (3) designing mechanisms for insuring against
these risks. 3 This section identifies what market institutions and regulatory structures would be most useful
in limiting or protecting against these risks. 4
1. Protection Against Individual Risk
One reason people face old-age insecurity is that they are unable to protect themselves and their
families against consumption  shortfalls in old age. This is sometimes  due to personal attributes such as low
earnings ability and/or inability to save.  Alternatively, it might be due to myopia, such as when people
underestimate their likely life  expectancy in retirement.  Yet another source of  insecurity is health  or
'By 2010,  most  Latin  America  and Asian  nations  will experience  substantial  increases  in  the fraction  of the population  over  age 60
(Ahmad  et al 1991;  Grosh  1990;  ILO  1989).
2 For a review  of old-age  systems  reforms  around  the world  see Williamson  and  Pampel  (1993);  World  Bank  (1994);  and Demirguc-
Kunt  and  Scharz  (1996).
Additional  rationales  sometimes  offered  for government  intervention  in old-age  retirement  income  include  raising  national  saving;
stimulating  capital  markets  and  economic  growth;  bailing  out poorly  performing  govemment-owned  enterprises;  subsidizing  housing
markets;  and funding  investment  in "infrastructure"  or other "social  targets"*  (Mitchell  and Hsin  forthcoming).  These  we consider
ancillary  effects  of social  security  systems.  but do not hold  them  to be potent  reasons  to have  an old-age  system  (Fields  and  Mitchell
1  993).
B  Bodie  (1990)  also identifies  a range  of risks  against  which  pension  systems  can protect;  he does  not,  however.  follow  the
organizational  logic  identified  here.
-Iemployment shocks - workers may experience unanticipated eamings declines due to disability or job loss
due to unemployment. 5 It is useful to think of two approaches that may be used to handle such risks - risk
avoidance  and insurance.
Risk Avoidance for Individuals and their Families
Focusing first on risk avoidance, workers might curtail their risk of old-age  poverty by improving
their earnings capacity. This enables  them and their families to retire later, and to save more on their own,
both of which diminish the chance of inadequate consumption in old age.  Such  an approach  encompasses
investments in worker education, health, skills training, and perhaps labor market mobility (if jobs  are
lacking where the workers reside).  Similarly worker training in financial planning  is  useful for reducing
the probability of suffering retirement consumption shortfalls. This is because better informed decision
makers are likely to save more and more effectively, to protect against old-age shortfalls.  The general goal,
of  course, is  to  increase workers'  awareness  of  the  need  for  retirement saving and  enhance their
understanding of investment principles.  To this end, for example, Uruguay recently launched a public
education campaign emphasizing the importance of saving for retirement (in connection  with its pension
privatization reform; see Mitchell 1997).  Also employer-based retirement education  efforts in the US
have been found to result in substantial irnprovements  in workers' voluntary retirement  saving rates (Clark
and Schieber forthcoming; Mitchell and Moore 1997).
Having suggested that greater retirement saving would enhance retirement security, the question
arises as to what people should invest in.  It may be that having a strong stock market is helpful for a
powerful and reliable pension system, though little is known about whether pension  systems  are spurred by
stock market growth or vice versa.  It does appear that stock market growth enhances  overall economic
development (Demirguc-Kunt  and Levine 1996a).
Moving beyond  the  individual and  family form  of  saving to  the  workplace, a  measure  of
protection against old-age consumption shortfalls can also be achieved by encouraging  specific retirement
programn  features in company, occupational, or national pension systems.  For example,  workers are more
likely to  contribute to  an  group pension  program when  retirement payouts are  linked closely to
contributions, as contrasted to a plan where taxes paid are unrelated to benefits paid out (World Bank
1994).  As  a result, defined contribution pension plans are more likely to diminish retirement system
evasion than are means-tested or redistributive defined benefit altematives.  A related argument is that
workers who can take their pension savings with them as they move across the labor market are more
likely to amass retirement savings for old age.  Hence rules permitting easier job mobility  via pension
vesting and portability are likely to attract and retain more workers in an employment-based  retirement
system.
Tax reform is a step govermnents can take to help cut old-age insecurity due to individual risk.
This is because high payroll taxes encourage movement into informal sector  work, where workers are often
excluded from participation in retirement programs (Gruber 1995).  Payroll taxes  tend to be quite high in
many developing countries, with the result that substantial segments of the population  remain outside the
public retirement system.  Lower payroll taxes may well enhance compliance with the system, generating
more retirement income (Manchester 1997).  Also, offering workers tax subsidies  to save for retirement, or
moving toward a consumption tax rather than an income tax, enhances participation  in pension and other
deferred saving programs (Dilnot 1996). Hence tax policy can increase old-age  consumption  by inducing
workers to participate in the retirement system and inducing them to save more over  their worklives.
We do not focus here on the risk of leaving one's dependents in poverty without life insurance. While many old-age public systems
do provide dependent coverage for death of the breadwinner(s), retirement coverage and not life insurance  is the focus of our
discussion here.
-2-Insurance  for Workers  and the Retired
A  second  approach to  individual (or household)  risk  management involves  insurance. For
examnple,  retirees who have accumulated retirement assets may run the risk of depleting their accumulated
retirement assets before dying, a particular concern in a defined contribution pension plan.  In this case
having a well-developed private annuity market will make it easier and less expensive to obtain annuity
benefits - insurance against living too long.  Recent research suggests that private annuity markets do
suffer from adverse selection - i.e. those  individuals who purchase annuities tend to  live longer than
average - though this problem has declined over time and annuities are now more competitively priced as
compared to 25 years ago (in the US at least; Mitchell et al. 1997).  Some public pension systems offer an
alternative to the private annuity market, by guaranteeing retirees a life-long benefit under the national
old-age system.  For example, under the Chilean privately-managed mandatorv pension system, workers
concerned about longevity are entitled  to convert part of their asset accumulations into a real annuity at
retirement (Diamond and Valdes Prieto 1994).
Shocks to  earnings capacity due to  poor health, disability, and'or  skill obsolescence are  also
insurable, though disability and unemployment insurance systems.  One problem with such systems is
that they tend to suffer from moral hazard: that is, those who buy the  insurance are likely to be able to
influence  the chances of needing the benefit. Hence, irrespective of whether a disability program is public
or private, it  is typically necessary to  structure the  system so  as to  require  the  worker  to undergo
examination prior to receiving benefits, as well as to remain without coverage for an initial period -
which acts as a deductible - and to only receive partial salary replacement  - which acts as co-insurance.
These design features  place some of the income risk on participants, as a means of reducing moral hazard.
While these programs are designed  to meet needs due to unexpected changes in earnings capacity
in old age, there is also the broader risk of people simply having low lifetime earnings, which generally
translates  into low old-age income as well. The social insurance literature suggests that sort of risk may not
be dealt with well on the individual or family level, and may be protected against at the group level, in
plans offered by workers' employers, unions, or at the government level.
At the firm or occupational level, for instance, having a group pension plan into which regular
contributions  are made tends to increase worker saving and, eventually, retirement income (Munnell 1976).
Plan type  can  make a  difference too:  a  defined  contribution plan  has  the  advantage of  increasing
participation due to its linking of contributions and benefits as mentioned above, but the DC plan yields
low benefits to low lifetime earners.  Thus consumption risk due to lifetime low income is not particularly
well protected by a DC system, and defined benefit pensions are often valued as being more redistributive
than DC plans. 6
At the governmental level, a targeted way to protect against inadequate old-age consumption is
anti-poverty  programs with strict means testing. In Uruguay and Australia, for instance, the elderly poor
are eligible for minimum benefits after a particular age, assuming they are not well-off (Davis 1993;
Mitchell 1997).  Such social assistance programs, however, tend to discourage work and saving among
able-bodied people quite far up the  income distribution (Hubbard et  al  1995).  Hence the  conundrum
presented by recent research on old-age support is that over-generous social insurance programs may
actually  reduce rather than raise private provision for old-age consumption.
6 It is possible to design a DC plan that is redistributive. For example. low-wage workers participating in a national defined
contribution plan might be provided with higher matching levels than the match rate paid to higher eamers to provide a floor of
security under retiree income, see Mitchell and Fields 1994.
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A different but pervasive source of old-age risk arises when the pension or retirement system itself
is poorly  managed.  These problems may  arise  because many  different  entities  or  agencies have
responsibility for separate pieces of the  old-age retirement  system, depending on the  industry and/or
occupation of participants. They may also arise to the diversity of institutional forms for the retirement
institution  itself. Sometimes  a pension system will be a separate legal entity from the sponsoring employer,
union, or government employer, and other times the lines are less clearly drawn.  For example, when old-
age retirement systems are operated by politicians or their political appointees, undue pressures can have a
deleterious influence on pension funding and asset management (Hsin and Mitchell 1994). In other cases,
employers may offer a pension program that is not held separate from the rest of the sponsor's financial
activities. This might occur, for example, when employers' or unions' retirement plans fail to manage the
funds as fiduciaries and instead commingle funds or simply fail to hold reserves at all.  Another such
instance arises when an employer, government, and/or union fails to contribute as required to the pension
fund, exposing it to the risk of bankruptcy and the nonpayment of promised benefits.  This is particularly  a
problem for public sector employees in many parts  of the world, as well  as union-run pension funds.'
Once again we find it useful to think of two approaches that may be used to handle such risks - risk
avoidance  and insurance.
Risk Avoidance in Pension  Management
Management problems such as those just sketched arise due to a principal-agent problem, where
retired plan participants  have a strong interest in preserving the benefit flows, but retirement plan managers
(and perhaps active workers)  may be more concerned keeping the plan sponsor afloat.  Mechanisms  must
therefore be designed  to reduce  the potential  for conflict of interest issues inherent in this system.
Avoidance  mechanisms include  putting  in  place  a  regulatory  structure  for  oversight  of
contributions including computerization  and record-keeping.  Actuarial staff should produce timely and
accurate  reports on plan  liabilities and  expected  income.  The system as  a  whole  should be  held
accountable to performance standards for benefit eligibility, benefit amount accuracy, and grievances
with regard to  services rendered. If the pension plan  is funded,  investment and  expense performance
standards should be established for the asset managers in terms of services rendered, investment returns,
and administrative costs. 8
Several other steps can also reduce retirement system risk.  For example, pension managers can be
required to meet so-called "prudent  man" standards, as under the ERISA (Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of  1974) in the US.  This requires trustees to manage a pension plan carefully according to
accounting and financial principles; trustees are then held personally liable for misspent pension moneys.
In addition, risk exposure will be more evident if pensions must disclose information to plan participants.
Annual reports of pension system status to participants and government are  also required whenever a
pension plan has changed. Tracking  pension inflows and outflows is facilitated when plans are required to
follow accounting  conventions  such as those developed by the US Financial Accounting Standards  Board
(FASB); these require that publicly traded firms display theiT  pension plan's status on the corporate  balance
sheet (McGill et al 1996). These include the requirement that pension systems mark assets to market  and
make public actuarial assumptions  used in determining the pension plan's financial status.  In Britain, a
series of reforms passed subsequent to the Maxwell pension scandal now mandate periodic review and
reporting to plan participants  as well as the government (Dilnot 1996).
For a discussion of pension funding pattems around the world see Davis (1993).
' For examples of comparisons of retirement  system service delivery and administrative costs see Mitche]l (1996a) and Demirguc-
Kunt and Schwarz (1996).
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pension participants have a clear claims. This often requires legal recourse to grieve and potentially sue
malfeasant pension fund managers (including their employers and/or unions if these are charged with
managing the retirement plans).  Vesting and portability regulations also help reduce participant risks, as
does making pensioners senior creditors in  bankruptcy cases.  Such rules increase the chance that a
covered worker will keep a pension account even if the sponsoring employer runs into financial difficulty
(Gustman  et  al.  1994) . Allowing employees to  select  their  own  pension manager also  affords
competitive pressure required to generate better pension plan performance.
Finally, pension systems are strengthened by collateralization of the retirement promise. In
practice this requires that assets are actually accumulated and invested - i.e. the plan is funded - rather
than having "book reserves" or "notional" accounts as practiced in Germany and Sweden (Ahrend 1996;
Stahlberg 1995).  In a defined benefit plan, actuaries must help determine the level of assets required for
full funding; in a funded defined contribution plans, assets accumulating are automatically owned by the
plan participants. Many countries also restrict  pension asset holdings, in order to reduce the perceived
chance that  pension  assets will lose value.  Thus until  recently,  West Virginia's  state pension  was
prohibited from holding any equities at all in its pension portfolio (Mitchell and Carr 1996). Pensions in
other states of the US, and in many other countries, are required to hold a minimum fraction of assets in
government bonds, or are prohibited from investing more than a specific fraction of the portfolio outside
the domestic market (Mitchell and Barreto 1997). However this practice can expose the plan to other risks
in turn, as we shall see below.
Pension System Insurance
Insurance can help secure retirement systems in several different ways.  One approach is to
require pension managers to purchase  trustee insurance, which has been shown to improve pension plan
funding and asset returns (Hsin and Mitchell 1997). Presumably this is because the premiums charged by
private insurers reflect the risks associated with different pension plan money management and funding
pattems.
There are also government  mechanisms that can protect against pension plan risk. Some countries,
such as the  US and Canada, have provided government guarantees to  defined benefit pension plans
offered by private employers  (Bodie et al 1996, Pesando 1996). A serious concem with these government
insurance plans in the case of defined benefit pensions is that they fail to discourage pension underfunding,
a behavior that then must be regulated (Ippolito 1996).  In other countries, such as Germany, risk-pooling
employer solvency funds diversify the risks of any one plan sponsor's bankruptcy (Bodie and Mitchell
1996).  In the case of defined contribution pensions, oftentimes governments have offered rate of return
guarantees, or minimum benefits.  As Pennacchi (1997) notes, however, these guarantees can also have
deleterious effects - by freeing participants from responsibility for monitoring their pension funds, and by
encouraging pension managers to invest in non-optimal portfolios. ).  In  general, reducing pension risk
requires oversight  of  pension contributions, investments, and  money  management, as  well  as  better
funding.
3.  Protection Against Country-wide  Risk
Retirement system's ability to protect retirees'  economic security also depends on a strong and
reliable macroeconomy. Specifically, retirement systems are not likely to fare well when threatened by an
unpredictable tax environment, erratic inflation, and/or volatile legal and other property rights.  These
country-level concerns become magnified  many times over in the case of pension systems seeking to invest
and maintain financial soundness for the very long term.  Here too it is useful to think of two approaches
that could be designed to handle such risks - risk avoidance  and insurance.
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A central concern to those seeking  to strengthen  retirement systems in developing countries is that
of banking system weakness. This is because  funded pension systems usually hold at least some national
and commercial bank assets, so that weak banks threaten  the overall survival of the retirement program.  In
fact, many experts have suggested that banking reform is an  essential precursor to retirement system
development (Patrick 1996; Schmidt-Hebbel 1993; Stiglitz 1993).  The  central important of  banking
reform was highlighted during the mid-1980's, when the Chilean government had  to take over several
major banks because of massive bad loans, a process which Edwards (1996a and b) argues was essential
for the survival of the new funded DC pension system  that had begun to invest in bank assets.  Banking
system weakness is also a major concern in many other nations currently moving toward retirement system
reform, including nations in Eastern Europe  (Turner  and Rajnes 1996).
A related banking  system risk  facing many developing country pension systems is that  of  domestic
currency risk.  This involves both domestic inflation and exchange rate risk, since domestically-invested
assets often cannot be properly inflation indexed.  More generally,  there is the risk of having a small and
poorly-functioning  capital market, a situation common to many smaller developing nations around the
world.  When there are only a few publicly-held  companies, it is naturally difficult for the pension system
to diversify  very widely by holding only  these few domestic holdings. And when the capital market is thin,
it is difficult to value the domestic assets properly,  making it difficult for a pension program to take good
account of risk and potential retums associated  with a potential investment venture.
Risks of  this  sort are  not necessarily obstacles to pension reform, inasmuch  as they may  be
handled in a variety of ways.  Focusing first on what a pension system can do, national risk may often be
curtailed by moving to greater international  diversification of pension assets (Kotlikoff 1995).  This
point is strengthened  by recent research showing  that people in developed countries hold portfolios far too
concentrated in domestic market capital assets (Baxter and Jermann 1997).  Since human capital is (in
general) nondiversifiable, and  labor income growth and domestic capital market retums  are  strongly
positively correlated, workers would diversify  better by selling short their home  country's  assets and
holding their  wealth in an  intemationally diversified portfolios.  This research  has  focused  only  on
developed nations to date, but it is possible that similar findings would apply to the developing country
arena.
We  note  that  though  international diversification of  pension  assets  would  curtail  pension
participant domestic capital market risk, in practice many developing countries have been reluctant to let
pension assets flow to the exterior. For instance,  most of the Latin American pension systems strictly limit
foreign investment holdings by retirement systems,  and even in Chile where up to 20% of the pension may
legally be  invested outside the country, less than one percent of assets is actually held in non-Chilean
investments  (World Bank 1996).
Another mechanism to protect the retirement system against domestic risk would involve legal
system reform, designed to reduce fraud and to increase the possibility that contracts will be paid when
due.  A useful approach might be to establish a regulatory body similar to the US Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), charged  with limiting  self-dealing  and insider trading. To this end a range of reporting
and disclosure mechanisms could be put in place in order to elaborate the nature of long-tern investment
contracts.
On a related front, most countries also need to undertake comprehensive insurance regulation
reform (Outreville 1990, 1996 b and c).  This is particularly  needful when, as in many developing nations,
confidence  in  insurers  is  low  due  to  past  political experiences and  also  to  poor  past  investmnent
performance. Insurers in particular suffer in times of economic transition since their ability to forecast
economic and demographic futures is likely to be impaired, making even more difficult the process of
stabilizing  this sector of the financial sector.
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A different national risk that affects retirement systems is the  risk of inflation eroding, benefit
payments. Inflation has been demonstrated to have significant deleterious effects on pension payouts in
unfunded systems across a wide range of countries; some public pension systems in Eastern Europe have
experienced massive benefit cuts due to inflation over time (World Bank 1994).  An old-age system must
be concerned about this risk  because it affects both pension assets and pension liabilities.
In the case of an unfunded plan, a pension system will depend on the tax base to generate a steady
flow of revenue - but this tax base often shrinks in times of falling real wages and rising tax evasion.  A
funded plan will depend more heavily on asset returns to cover promises, but these asset values will fall
with inflation unless there is some formal mechanism to keep up.  A way to reduce this inflationary risk is
to  have govermnents issue inflation indexed  bonds.  These are  already  offered by  governments in
Australia, Brazil, Chile, the UK and recently the US, and initial evidence suggests that these do appeal to
pension managers for some component of the pension portfolio. An alternative approach might be to have
governments issue (real) sovereign debt guarantees  to protect against country-specific  risk (Maclsaac and
Babbel 1994), though this is not yet a reality.
4.  What Remains: Systematic or Nondiversifiable  Global Risk
Having identified several types of economic risks that old-age systems can help protect against,
some factors are impossible to avoid and/or insure against. That is, retirement systems will always be
susceptible to internationally nondiversifiable risks, including those arising from war and other political
disruptions, global natural disasters, epidemics of international proportions, massive capital shocks, and
other factors not well understood  or predictable.  In  this  case, governments and  other old-age plan
sponsors would best admit that some risks simply cannot be protected against, and thus popular opinion
and  political  expectations will be  met  with  honest  assessments of  system difficulties,  should  such
eventualities occur.
III.  STRENGTHENING  INSTITUTIONS  SUPPORTIVE  OF PENSION  REFORM
Reforming a retirement program  is facilitated if  key social, economic, and  legal  institutions
supportive of  this mission are  also in place.  In this  section we explore how a  range  of  supportive
institutions can help reduce and perhaps insure some of the risks facing old-age programs.  The supporting
entities we have in mind include financial institutions such as, most directly, pension regulatory agencies,
as well as  financial and labor market institutions. When these are strong, they can enhance the financing,
benefit payout, money management, and recordkeeping functions required by a well-functioning old-age
system (Schmidt-Hebbel 1993; Holzmann 1996; Vittas 1995a and b).  In what follows here, we seek to
identify which supporting institutions are essential and useful in moving to a more solvent, efficient, and
equitable national retirement system.
1. Establishing  a Credible National Old-Age Income System
When designing a  sustainable old-age system, it must be recalled that such a  system must be
credible for dozens, ideally hundreds, of years.  That is, the goal of a retirement program is to enhance
workers' expectations of benefits when old, over many cohorts - and the system is anticipated to be in
effect for very long time into the future.  As a result, one of the fundamental efforts of  old-age system
reform is to structure an environment in which such long-term retirement claims are taken to be sustainable
for the long run.
Toward this end, countries generally find it critically important to define long-term old-age
contractual obligations, and  also to institute a  supervisory mechanism for monitoring and enforcing
-7-these.  This is  obviously  needed when the  old-age reform  involves private investment of  workers'
contributions in a  defined contribution type  account.  But  it is also  irnportant in  a  defined benefit
environment since promised benefits will be judged more trustworthy when such long-term legal claims
can be enforced.
The practical implementation of this idea is to establish a pension oversight body, often called a
"pension superintendency". This has been done in many Latin American countries, where it is charged
with  regulating and  overseeing the  pension  arena.  Typically such an  agency oversees  standardized
information disclosure, ensures maintenance of records, reviews collection of  pension investment and
administrative cost data, and  enforces laws on pension fund reserves and management. Having such an
institution  clearly strengthens participants' rights and increases  confidence in the system.
One feature of a  well-run pension supervisory agency is that it be independent of the pension
funds themselves, so as to minimize conflict of interest.  This protects against politicians seeking to sway
investmnent  decisions, or  channeling private funds into "socially targeted" investments earning  below-
market returns or embodying above-average risk.  Having a formal grievance mechanism for addressing
participants' contributions and investment problems can be a useful step for building confidence as well
(Bodie at  al. 1996; Hsin and Mitchell 1994).  Rarely does this process spring fully formed: rather the
process is often evolutionary, as described by Bustamante (1996) in his discussion of  the  group that
interprets and regulates Chile's pension law.
When discussing the role of a pension regulatory structure it is also important to mention the role
of  government protection against  pension fund  insolvency.  Such  guarantees are  used  in some
developed nations (Bodie at al. 1996), and are increasingly being adopted in developing countries as well
(Mitchell and Barreto 1997).  In the case of a defined contribution system, for instance, a protective law
may require that pension managers be relieved of their duties if they earn less than some amount below the
average rate of return; this  practice has been adopted in Chile and Mexico.  In other countries, pension
regulations require that a minimum real rate of return be earned on pension investments.  Where defined
benefit pensions are the norm, it is not uncommon to have a government insurance agency backstop of
private funds in cases of insolvency, as mentioned above.  One problem with such government guarantees
is that they represent potentially massive claims on the national tax system, should pension performance  be
less than robust (Pennacchi 1997).  Any government reforming its old-age system should think carefully
before offering  such  a  guarantee,  and  thoroughly  analyze the potential costs of  a  guarantee  before
proceeding with adoption. Developed country experience suggests that private market insurance of these
guarantees should be required to the  extent possible, though pricing the  insurance premiums may be
difficult for countries lacking experience with such a system (Ippolito 1996).
2.  Financing the System and Tax Reform
Tax reform  is often seen as critical for financing retirement system reforms, since mandatory
pension systems depend on tax collection for revenue. In addition, reformers must recognize that tax
evasion is  endogenous - that  is,  the  higher the  payroll  tax  rate  for  mandatory retirement  system
participants, the less likely will people be to work "on the books" and hence submit their earnings to the
payroll tax.  This is an important issue empirically: higher payroll tax rates have been found to cut taxable
payrolls in Chile quite substantially (Gruber  1995), and Manchester  (1997) concludes that the decoupling
of high payroll tax rates from benefit entitlements induces evasion.
A related problem endemic in developing countries everywhere is that of tax system "technical
weaknesses". For example, the US recently revealed that its  Internal Revenue Service was inconsistent in
its data collection efforts, failed to  have quality assurance criteria regarding its software, and  did not
systematically assess consumer satisfaction and costs of tax collection (USGAO 1996b). Lack of voluntary
compliance was estimated at approximately 17% of potential revenues (USGAO 1996a).  How extensive
problems are in the tax collection arena in developing nations is harder to estimate but no doubt endemic,
and threatens the abilitv of countries  to raise revenue needed for old-age benefits.
-8  -Of course another way tax policy affects old-age well-being has to do with the tax status of
pensions.  Sheltering pension contributions from income taxes powerfully influences peoples'  willingness
to contribute, to maintain their inside buildups, and to manage payouts from pension plans (Dilnot 1996).
This implies that tax  reform should consider how tax  rates influence peoples'  willingness to  save via
pensions.  In particular, exempting pension contributions  from taxable  income is generally considered a
tax program supportive of pension reform. 9
3. Why Reforming Financial Infrastructure  Is Important
Some argue that retirement system reform works most effectively when such an effort is paired
with financial infrastructure  reforms (e.g. Vittas 1995a).  By financial infrastructure, we mean the "legal
and accounting procedures,  the organization of trading and clearing facilities, and the regulatory structures
that govern the relations among the users of the financial system" (Merton and Bodie 1995).  Obviously
financial system reforms are undertaken for a variety of reasons associated with spurring growth generally,
not just  to assist in the restructuring of a pension system.  But in this  section the goal  is to ask how
improved performance of banks, stock markets, and insurance companies can facilitate pension refornn. 1
The Role of Strong Banks in Pension Reform
Particularly in developing countries, the banking  system plays a key role in mobilizing savings
and making them accessible  to borrowers; as McKinnon (1973) noted almost a quarter-century ago, banks
are the primary and sometimes the only financial institution to mobilize saving in developing countries.
Lack of confidence in the financial system can produce bank runs, a phenomenon that most economists
agree requires government  protection to mitigate if not prevent.  But since most pension funds hold large
portions of their assets in bank bonds, bank reform is generally seen as critical for pension reformn  (and
financial market development in general, especially in the Soviet bloc economies; see Stiglitz 1993).  A
stable banking environment  requires "clear  evaluation of bank assets, the monitoring of bank behavior, and
the enforceability of remedies in the face of bank default" (Santomero 1996, p.  6). Therefore the most
commonly agreed-on functions required to protect a nation's banking system include (a) a licensing group
that screens out bad bank managers; (b) a supervisory group that limits bank managers' risky portfolios; (c)
a termination or wind-up agency that can shut down insolvent banks before creditors are left penniless, and
(d) a method of securing  lending at last resort (Santomero 1996).
These points clearly apply powerfully to pension  savers, who  care not only about  short-term
returns on money saved but also about preserving consumption in retirement against the wide range of
risks described above.  Those saving for retirement have the longest time horizon, implying that it is this
group that depends the most on financial institutions' ability to carefully evaluate and properly monitor
long-term investment  projects. Hence banking system reform clearly strengthens institutions supportive of
pension reform efforts."
9Of  course  a wide  range  of  tax  laws  also  affect  national  investment  levels  generally,  as  when  capital  gains  tax  rates  influence
investors'  willingness  to hold  domestic  securities  in  developing  countries  (Demirguc-Kunt  and  Huzinga  1995;  Levine  1991).
10  Recent  expericnces  in  Latin  America  highlight  the  cost  of  not  managing  banks  well:  thus  far  the  Brazilian  govemmcnt  has  had  to
provide  more  than $20  billion  in loans  to fortifv  Banco  do  Brasil  along  with  two other  private  banks,  and  recently  took  over  Banespa,
a Sao  Paolo  state  bank  $19  billion  in  debt  (Economist  1996b).  In  Venezuela  over  half  of all  commercial  banks  required  government
insolvency  fund  support;  Mexico's  peso  crisis  in 1994  was  in  part  attributed  to  the  recognition  that  several  imponant  banks  had
overextended.  These  problems  extend  to  other  contents  as  well:  20  nations  in  Africa  experienced  banking  crises  from  1988  to 1996,
banks  in  Eastern  Europe  have  been  bailed  out  several  times,  and  several  banks  in  Asia  have  come  under  scrutiny  following  the
collapse  of  a Korean  steel  company  that  put  $3  billion  in  bank  loans  in  jeopardy  (Economist  1997).  Many  of the  banks  in  developing
countries are govemment-owned,  a factor that makes overhaul politically delicate: in China, for instance, state-run banks control more
than 90% of all bank assets, in India the figure is over 70%0,  and in Brazil it is close to 50% (Economist 1997: 11) In countries
formerly part of the Soviet Union (FSU) the transition has been made more complex by the fact that enterprise reform and
privatization is often necessary before bank reform can be undertaken.
"It  is worth acknowledging that there are other financial institutions capable of handling some of the functions that banks have
traditionally managed. In the US, for instance, the rapidly growing mutual fund industry has captured large parts of the defined
-9-As one might imagine, the recent and promised future proliferation of financial intermediaries
makes the scope of potential regulation to protect the old-age  system ever more complex.  In other words,
not only must governments consider bank regulation as a necessary  step in pension reform, but also they
also  must  put  in  place  regulation covering many  other types of  saving/investment institutions
increasingly growing in popularity. Only by requiring disclosure  and  spelling out precisely governments'
role in the event of insolvency, will consumers be protected against fraudulent pyramid schemes (witness
the recent problems in Albania) and guided into more stable  long-term investments.
Whether a developing nation must "grow its own" financial  system  regulatory structure is a matter
subject to great debate.  Existing banks are sometimes inadequately  capitalized to protect against highly
volatile asset  movements in  developing  countries, and developing countries might  find  it  useful  to
encourage foreign banks to open branches meeting international  regulatory standards (Economist 1997:
33).  There is also room for international agencies to help form and maintain an  umbrella structure
offering participating countries a standard format for financial  system reporting and regulation (Fields and
Mitchell 1993).  12 A  rationale for having developing countries  subscribe  to international  banking standards
is that internationally agreed-on accounting and disclosure  rules are thought to limit the need for bank
bailouts.  Advantages would accrue to domestic investors, including those  arnassing assets in funded
pension systems, and also foreign investors.';
The Role of Stock Markets in Pension Reform
In addition  to a well-functioning  banking system,  many have argued that pension reform programs
benefit from having a smoothly functioning and well regulated stock market.  Of course stock market
development is most crucial when the pension system is a funded one with investments for the long term.
In this event, the most important role of the stock market is to value risky domestic assets."'  To this end,
some countries have established a government rating agency to oversee investmnent  valuation:  in Chile,
for instance, the government-run Risk Rating Commission  contributed  heavily to the growth of the stock
market and hence to pension privatization in that country (Bustamante  1996).
Though many agree that having a stock market is useful for pension reform, it seems unlikely to
be  a  necessary precondition.  For  one thing,  government securities constitute the  bulk of  financial
instruments available in developing countries, as in Mexico where government securities account for 35%
of  bank holdings, and  in Brazil  40%  (Allen and  Santomero 1996; Economist  1977).  These assets
frequently constitute the majority of pension assets in the early stage of fund development.  For another
thing, the global bond market is becoming accessible  to developing  countries; for instance several Latin
American cities have recently sold bonds on the world capital  market  (Wall Street Journal 1997).
As a  result of these developments, small countries may not need devote extensive resources to
establishing domestic stock markets.  That is, govemments seeking to reform their old-age systems can
facilitate pension systems' access to international  scale economies  and financial expertise. In addition,
contribution  pension  arena  in the last decade,  and  even  defined  benefit  pension  plans  are  being  outsourced",  or managed  by
consulting firms partnering with financial groups such as mutual funds  or trust companies (Hoffmnan  and Santomero 1997).
12 One  such  structure  already  in place  is the Concordat  outlining  minimum  recommended  capital  standards  for bank  reserves  (Herring
and Santomero 1995). The International Monetary Fund is also working  to improve  oversight of intemational banks, and several
regional  groups  are also discussing  cooperation  along  similar  lines  (Economist  1997:  17).
'; Sometimes  requiring  geater bank transparency  and  reporting  forces  a country  to come  to terms  with  outstanding  and  massive  bank
debts  already  incurred,  often  concentrated  on the books  of state-operated  banks.  This  might  be destabilizing  for a pension  system
heavily  invested  in paper  issued  by such  banks.
" Having a strong stock market can also enhance national growth rates according  to Boyd and Smith (1996), and Demirguc-Kunt and
Levine (1996a and b). Further, developing country stock has apparently been  quite a good investment in recent years, as experts have
shown that emerging markets have demonstrated high retums and low covariance  with the global market (Goetzman and Jorion
1997b).  This may explain the recent global proliferation of developing-country  stock markets: almost 20,000 companies have been
listed on more than 60 emerging economy stock markets in the last decade, with capitalization estimated at around $2 billion (World
Bank 1996).
- 10-recent research  shows that  global asset  indices  have experienced lower volatility than  single-market
indexes over the last century (Davis 1996; Goetzman and Jorion 1997a; Mitchell 1996a; Hsin and Mitchell
1997). As a result, international  diversification of pension portfolios is frequently recommended  to reduce
pensioners' dependence on a  single (domestic) capital market.  This lesson has  been resisted by some
countries undertaking pension reform as they drastically limit foreign investment by pension savers (e.g.
Chile, Argentina, Mexico, Peru, Colombia; see Mitchell 1996b;  Mitchell and Barreto 1997).
Another reason that a strong domestic stock market need not be a precondition for pension reform
is that stocks have not been a particularly important source of new funds for investment in the past (Stiglitz
1993). This is evidently  true even for the US and the UK - despite the fact that these two nations have the
oldest and best developed stock markets in the world. Having a large stock market in developing countries
has not been a barrier  to mounting a pension reform in Peru, Colombia, Chile, and Argentina, and Bolivia's
current  reform is occurring  simultaneously with  privatization of  government-run enterprises and  the
development of a capital market (Fittipaldi 1994).  Of course, having a strong stock market can likely
facilitate retirement  system reform,  particularly  if  listing  firms  also  follow  internationally accepted
accounting standards, affording investors (or their  agents) the needed  information on risk and return
potential.
The Role of Insurance  Sector Reform
A  strong and competitive insurance market is another important element in building a robust
financial system, and probably critical for pension reformn  - particularly in the case of funded pension
plans.  This is because at the point of retirement, people will seek to purchase annuities with their pension
accruals, in order to protect against longevity. Nevertheless, annuities can emerge only when an economy
offers reliable  insurance firms  that  can  make  these  products  appealing.  Unfortunately insurers  in
developing countries have suffered performance problems over the years.  In Bolivia for instance, 15
insurance firms failed since 1960, and products sold by the remaining firms were  seriously eroded by
inflation (Mclsaac and Babbell 1994). In other cases, high administrative costs and adverse selection (only
those expecting to live long buy the  coverage)  are  perceived to be  an  obstacle to  annuity purchase
(Mitchell et al 1997).
To strengthen insurer operation in developing countries, it is important to reform insurance law
and regulation.  This is accomplished by  better  licensing of  insurance companies and their  agents,
enhancing reporting and disclosure, and requiring minimum capital requirements (Demirguc-Kunt 1996).
In addition governments typically restrict the riskiness of assets that may held by insurers to limit the
probability of default (Brady et al 1995).  Many nations also try to spell out what happens in the event of
an insurance firm insolvency, and some governments establish guarantee funds to cover this eventuality.
On a related theme, some countries have regulations regarding insurance commissions, on the theory that
consumer protection  requires limitations on what insurance agents can charge.  The difficulty, of course, is
that mandated commission structures sometimes exaggerate rather than reduce insurance costs.  Better
information in this area may be shortly forthcoming inasmuch as on-line and indeed international  computer
insurance sales have now become possible, enhancing global competition in insurance products.
Another pension-specific issue in the  insurance context has to do with the dearth of actuaries
capable  of pricing products such as lifetime annuities. This is particularly a problem in countries  where life
expectancies are changing quickly, and often no statistical databases are available with which to project
future mortality patterns. It may be that there is a need for some sort of international financial advisory
organization to collect and project mortality rates, offer regulatory guidelines for insurers, and disclosure
standards as well as reserve requirements in insurance as well as for the other financial sectors discussed
earlier (Fields and Mitchell  1993).  The idea would be  that adhering to these guidelines would make
developing countries' insurance companies more competitive and less costly in the long run.
Of course in considering this option it must be recognized that state-owned monopolies frequently
control the market in developino countries, limiting competition and keeping prices of insurance products
- 11 -high. The view that insurance deserves "infant industry" protection is a perspective out of favor in trade
circles, but still heard in many insurance circles (Kruger 1997; Skipper 1987). However research shows
that monopolistic insurance markets hinder income and growth potential, and have negative impacts on the
market for reinsurance as well  (Outreville 1996b).  In this event, it may be possible for regional Common
Markets to  establish reciprocity policies for insurers operating across participating nations, enabling
developing countries to devise more competitive and better functioning insurance markets  (Outreville
1996a).  In  addition, weakening government monopoly over insurance also increases the  demand for
reinsurance services (Outreville 1996c). All of these insurance market developments can strengthen the
ability  of pension systems  to cover longevity  risk, a key requirement of old-age retirement systems.
In addition to improving the general position of insurers in developing countries,  those who would
reform pensions must also recognize that tax protecting  the buildups held by insurers accumulating until
retirement can be critical in increasing pension saving.
The Role of Corporate Governance
In recent years a new literature has grown up linking a nation's legal system and its investment
environment. Controversy rages over which "causes" which, but it does appear that markets protective of
shareholder  rights produce better investment  growth (La Porta et al 1996). What this means to the pension
context is that pension participants are most likely to benefit from a common-law type system in which
investor rights are upheld over managers' interests. Of course the general issue of pension governance
is a complex topic, beyond the scope of the present analysis. Suffice it to say that the corporate governance
questions raised by US pension fund managers of late will undoubtedly become more salient in other
nations over the next few years (Useem 1996).
4.  Labor Market Reforms and Old-Age Protection
Governments seeking to protect against old-age consumption shortfalls would also do well to
consider labor market reforms consistent with greater  retirement security.  One concern is that developing
countries frequently have extensive regulations governing formal sector employment,  including high taxes
and labor protections that make employment  quite expensive. One source of such labor costs is a country's
social security system, where generous benefits must be paid for with high payroll taxes. In Brazil until
recently, for instance, workers could retire with only 6 years of contribution into the national pension
system, and  many nations have  payroll taxes of 40-60%,  discouraging the  demand for labor.  As a
consequence, countries undertaking pension reforms often implement a two-pronged approach, seeking to
both lower payroll tax rates and also to cut benefits from public pension systems by raising eligibility
barriers, increasing retirement ages, and curtailing benefit formulas.  These changes are labor market
reforms in and of themselves, reducing the relative price of  labor, linking benefits to contributions, and
shrinking  the size of the government-provided  public pension promise.
In addition, there are various other so-called labor market reforms that may be  supportive of
retirement reform, including policies making the labor market more flexible.  In  Chile this  included
cutting severance pay benefits that firms had  to pay laid off workers, and curtailing the power of labor
unions to strike as well as bargain European style industry-wide  contracts (Edwards and Edwards 199  1))-
Others hold up wage flexibility as an important way to increase  market flexibility. While it might
not be directly  tied to pension reform, it is likely  that higher minimum wage policy induces  flows out of the
formal into the informal sector - where workers are then excluded from formal pension coverage.  Some
have argued, in fact, that automatic national wage indexation implemented in Chile in 1979 retarded the
structural changes needed to undergo to further economic reform (Edwards and Edwards 1991).  The fact
that the social security  payroll tax at the time was over 36% exacerbated  these wage rigidity problems.
15  As  a consequence  Chilean  workers'  unionization  declined  by 2/3 between  1973 and  1985 (Velasco  1994).
- 12-Pension reform also often demand a second labor market effort - namely civil service reform.
This is often most evident when a large unfunded government-run pension is in need of overhaul: typically
new human resource policies are required to encourage civil servants to do better budget projections,
manage hurnan and capital resources better, and provide better services to plan participants.  Redesigned
compensation  and reward systems for remaining public servants can increase their accountability and make
their pay more dependent on performance.  If successful, a better managed public system will be  less
expensive and higher quality services will be provided.'"
5. Monetary Policy Can Also Influence  Pension Reform
It is beyond the scope of the present paper to describe why and how a developing country might
seek to reform its monetary policy.  Nevertheless when discussing which  institutions are supportive of
pension system reform, it must  be recalled that monetary stability  is often seen as  key  in building
confidence in a developing country's economy (Herring and Santomero 1995; Sachs et al 1996).
The relevance to pension reform is immediate.  Investors, including participants in a nation's
pension system, need to believe institutional  promises to deliver future consumption. Monetary instability,
particularly hyperinflation, hurts this credibility by reducing lenders' ability to manage default risk (Gleizer
1995). Pension participants are particularly vulnerable  to having benefits eroded by inflation in developing
countries (World Bank 1994).  The fact is, if retirees'  real consumption needs cannot be protected by
domestically traded assets, this greatly undermines peoples' willingness to pay into the system and also
undercuts their economic security in old age.  As noted earlier, a possible solution would be to allow
workers to devote a portion of their retirement saving to foreign investment to reduce the threat of
inflation risk.  Another alternative would be for governments to issue inflation-index linked bonds.  As
long as the indexation process was seen as invulnerable to political suasion, and the government reliably
paid off on these bonds, this mechanism  would help protect pension participants against inflation.
IV.  SEQUENCING  OF  INSTITUTIONAL  REFORMS  SUPPORTIVE  OF
PENSION SYSTEMS
Thus far we have described key institutional reforms supportive of pension system redesign.  We
next consider the important but elusive subject of "sequencing" - namely, which supporting institutions
must  be  put in  place first, and  which can be  implemented simultaneously, or  even deferred  until  a
retirement system reform is instituted. We note that this question is almost uninteresting to theorists, since
economic growth is believed to be furthered by liberalization  of all markets in a developing country, both
domestic and extemal (Kreuger 1997). But those working with the practical issues of old-age system
reforms in developing countries frequently confront the question of "what should come first - pension
reform or other reforms?"
Neither practitioners nor researchers have a single, unique response to this question; in fact, Vittas
has suggested that the best approach is probably to take advantage of reform opportunities when feasible,
then working incrementally as conditions permit (1995a).  Having said this, it remains the case that many
countries implementing a retirement system reform are typically compelled to do so by old-age system
insolvency. Hence the option of letting a public pension system default and cease payments is not often
politically viable, inasmuch as the elderly  population relying on government benefits can often organize
6 Between 1973 and 1990 the govemrnment  workforce shrank by over 50% or 175,000  jobs  in Chile. and by 305.000 jobs in
Argentina. This was mainly due to -outsourcing" much of public education to local and municipal govemments, but it was also in part
the result of tuming over portions of the retirement system to the private sector (Reid 1992).
- 13 -substantial political support. Indeed countries  from Russia to Argentina have faced politically  destabilizing
retiree demonstrations when government-provided  benefits have been delayed or reduced in the past.' 17
Against this backdrop, the first step in most countries' pension reform is typically to restructure
the  public old-age support system so as to ensure that  some  level of benefit promises can be met.
Achieving this objective will depend on the old-age system the country has inherited.  For example,  if a
public benefit program is costly because people file for disability at too early an age, as in Uruguay, the
first step in reform should tighten eligibility standards and perhaps target benefits as a function of need
(Mitchell  1997).  In  other cases, public benefits have  been  used  to  facilitate  the  privatization of
govermment-owned  enterprises, by paying for early retirement.  Here, public pension reform requires
restating the goal of support for old age,  not for the "losers" (e.g. unemployed workers) in a transition
economy (Fields and Mitchell 1993). If evasion is a problem, because benefit levels are only loosely  tied
to workers' contributions as in Brazil, the needed reform must raise both retirement ages and the years of
service required to qualify for benefits  (Gill 1997). If benefit levels are too high to be sustained,  there must
be a careful fnancial analysis of what is sustainable in the long run, and benefit cuts implemented." 8 Hence
the sorts of reforms undertaken depend both on the cause of the system's financial problems, and the tools
available with which to make payouts more affordable.
Better recordkeeping technology  typically is another high priority of public plan restructuring,
and  most developing countries will usually need to  modernize and computerize tax collection and
benefit records.  While many Latin American nations have had  social  security systems in place for
decades, they often rely on workers to keep track of their own earnings and taxes paid via a passbook  or
"carnef' system.  But workers may lose their records, and in addition a passbook system is open to fraud if
employers andlor workers collude to report lower earnings than actually received to  limit tax liability.
Benefit tracking is also required, to ensure that payments cease on the recipient's death, that means-tested
benefits are not granted to the well-off, and that dependents or survivors of deceased workers receive  their
entitlements if any.  In  addition this recordkeeping function should also help track system costs and
performance measures, so as to inform policymakers of system performance.
A second step needed to build the environment for better retirement security is to strengthen
financial markets - for all the reasons identified above.  Even if an unfunded public plan is the mainstay
of a country's refurbished retirement system, workers and employers can still be encouraged to respond  to
the  downsizing of public plan  benefits by  setting up their  own  privately-managed pensions. This is
desirable to take pressure off govemment-provided  benefits in the future.
By contrast, when a mandatory funded system is adopted, program success depends critically  on
having a store of value in which to deposit moneys associated with the pension fund.  This suggests  to
many that financial reforms must be  an important precursor to the establishment of  a funded system
(Holzrnann 1997). Most crucially, a market for government securities seems to be essential in the early
stages of pension reform, since government  bonds are often held in pension systems during their start-up
phase.  Indeed several Latin American countries adopting mandatory funded defined contribution  pensions
began by requiring that all pension assets be invested in government bonds.  Later these requirements  were
relaxed as local capital markets developed, with funds held  in bank bonds and  certificates as banking
reform occurred, and in domestic equity as enterprise privatization proceeded (Arrau et al. 1993;  Merton
and Bodie 1995; Fittipaldi 1994). Forcing funded pensions to initially hold only government bonds  allows
other financial sector reforms to take place in tandem with pension growth; this was Chile's approach,
where banking  reforms  and  stock market development continued  throughout the  1980's rather than
occurring at a single point in time (Diamond  and Valdes Prieto 1994).
17  For recent experience in Chile see Arrau (1994); Edwards and Edwards (1991); Wallich (1983); for Turkey see Demirguc-Kunt
(1996); for information on the formner  Soviet economies see Fox (1994) and Holzmann (1997); evidence for several  Asian  nations is
summarized in Asian Development Bank (1996). Vittas  (1996 and no date) and Hussain (1994).
'" What this sustainable level is will obviously depend on the country. World Bank experts tend to recommend replacement  ratios of
30-40% Dfthe average economy-wide  wage (Vittas 1995a and b; World Bank 1994)  though additional poverty considerations  might
indicate a higher rate for a floor benefit.
- 14 -The risk of requiring that pension funds be held entirely in government bonds is that this leaves
the  pension system vulnerable to  low returns and  susceptible to  political meddling in  pension fund
management.  This is a  real concern, since in the past, governmentally-managed pension funds have
frequently produced negative real returns. 19 Instead, participant funds must be transferred over time into
widely traded and valued financial assets with well-understood risk and return characteristics compatible
with world capital markets.
A more diversified pension portfolio could help protect against such risks particularly if pension
money is permitted to be  invested outside the domestic market.  Developing countries are  sometimes
reluctant to liberalize capital flows and exchange controls, and frequently this happens only late in the
development process (Edwards and Edwards 1991).  On the other hand many experts roundly criticize the
delay of exchange rate liberalization, in Chile in particular, as the single most critical flaw in the economic
program instituted  during the 1980's (Bosworth et al 1994). We do not seek to resolve this issue here, but
merely point out that foreign investments in the pension portfolios would strengthen protection against
country specific political risk.
The third step in creating institutions supportive of pension reforms is to reform the insurance
market in  ways identified in  Section II,  above.  Of  course, funded  pensions take  many  years  to
accumulate, so a goverment  could delay reforming insurance markets until retirement payouts become a
reality.  On the other hand, deferring insurance market reform may seriously undermine confidence in a
funded pension system. That is, if workers and employers believe that private insurers will not be able to
deliver benefits covering real consumption needs, they will be less likely to participate and pay legally
required taxes to the system. Supplementing  this perspective is the view of international insurance experts,
who  deem the  development of  insurance markets as  "supply-leading" - namely  that  a  well-defined
regulatory environment  precedes the demand for insurance services (Outreville 1990).
Next we come to the question of what priority should be accorded restructuring of labor market
institutions, in supporting pension system reform.  Reducing individual risk of old-age poverty relies on
improving workers' education and financial literacy, enhancing their lifetime earnings and saving rates.  Of
course, investment in human capital is usually key in any development program, but the possibility of
spillovers for the old-age program may not be widely appreciated.  Similarly some of the other reforms
already discussed, such as tax reform and public pension rationalization, will also have positive effects on
workers'  incentives to participate in the formal sector, and  employers'  ability to hire and  keep their
employees.
Last but certainly not least, there is the question of how to handle the cost of transition from an
unfunded to a funded system, a key problem in many pension reformn  programs.  This so-called transition
problem arises because taxes must typically be levied to both cover benefits for the already-retired, and
also to build up a funded account to cover active workers. Moving to a funded system therefore requires
double-taxation of current workers, unless by good fortune the  government has  accumulated a budget
surplus, as was true in Chile at the time it instituted its private plan.  More commonly, however, countries
undergoing old-age system reform confront already large government deficits, and adopting a funded plan
could well  increase needs for revenue.  Therefore while a  budget surplus  is a  desirable precursor to
retirement system reform, it is by no means a necessary condition (Mitchell and Zeldes 1996).
V.  CONCLUSIONS
Retirement system reform is one of the highest priority policy issues of the developing world. In
this  paper we have argued that  a country's  ability to construct a market and  regulatory environment
supportive of  its pension system powerfully influences the chances of pension  system success. These
'9  See World Bank (1994) and Hsin and Mitchell (1994). On the other hand there have also been long periods during which stock
markets around the world did not perforn  particularly  well (c.f Goetzmann and Jorion 1  997a and b).
- 15 -include individual risk, retirement system risk, country risk, and  nondiversifiable risk.  An  effective
retirement system reform plan  should seek to  better protect  participants against these risks by first
understanding  the source of the risk; second, figuring out how to avoid and reduce the risks; and third,
where possible insuring against these risks.  Each country faces old-age problems specific to  its own
history and institutions, but effective reform depends on reducing or insuring against the risks faced by
participants  in the system. While there are many paths to reforming retirement systems,  what matters in the
end is whether reforms can be said to improve system solvency, increase adequacy, efficiency, and equity;
and enhance  national saving (TIRS 1996).
A reform program necessarily takes place against a backdrop of institutions that can potentially be
supportive of retirement system growth.  We have argued here  that the  first step is to restructure any
existing  public old-age income system to achieve solvency.  This usually requires investing in information
technology to  track  taxes  and  benefits as  well  as  performance  standards and  program  efficiency.
Restructuring  the tax collection mechanism often requires tighter links between contributions  and benefits,
if possible  while reducing payroll taxes and devising funded accounts.  A second  priority area for reform is
the banking and insurance sector. The goal of this  effort is to  increase participants' confidence in the
system as a long term store of value.  Having a large and active stock market is not essential for funded
pensions, if participants (or the fund managers) have access to world capital markets.  However, most
pension plans seem to rely at least initially on government bonds, so these and reliable banks are essential
to pension plan development. Internationalization of a pension portfolio can help investors take advantage
of modem accounting, regulatory, and risk pricing techniques,  which explains why so many pension
experts favor liberalization  along this frontier. We have also shown that strengthening  the labor market can
help in old-age income reform as well.
In the end, of course, a stable retirement system reflects a balancing of retiree demands  for old-age
support against workers' willingness and ability to pay for this support. Specifically, if a funded pension
system is intended, available options for the transition path are strongly influenced by government budget
deficits and macroeconomic conditions.  Overarching these immediate-term considerations must  be  a
longer term perspective.  That is, instituting a credible retirement system for the long term depends on
growing workers'  assets as they  build up over the  work life, and insuring reliable flows of retirement
consumption  for decades in old-age.
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